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INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that telecommunications law, like
the industry that it regulates, has changed dramatically over
the past quarter-century. In 1977, the D.C. Circuit's Execunet'
decision and the subsequent actions of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") helped to forge a competitive long-
distance market. In 1982, an antitrust consent decree required
the breakup of the nation's telecommunications monolith, the
Bell System, from which most of the nation satisfied all of its
telecommunications demands.2 Well after both of these dates,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University. The author expresses
his appreciation to Dale N. Hatfield, Thomas W. Merrill, and Craig Allen Nard for
comments on drafts of this article.
1. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem.
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). See generally Joseph
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Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996,' which
attempts to break down barriers to competition not only in the
long-distance industry-where, by most accounts, competition
has flourished since the Bell System's breakup-but also in lo-
cal telephony.
Less discussed has been the fact that many of the legal
changes that have swept through the telecommunications in-
dustry-in broad outline, the emphasis by regulators on fos-
tering competition wherever possible-have had analogues in
other regulated industries. In particular, the transportation
industries (rail, air, and trucking) and the energy industries
(gas and electric) have been the sites of similar paradigm shifts
in regulation from promoting a monopoly or oligopoly model to
emphasizing competition.4
This article makes further inquiries into this great trans-
formation of regulated industries law, with particular regard to
the role of the regulator and towards the specific end of consid-
ering the FCC's future. Part I describes the current state of
traditional regulation in the transportation industry, which
was historically regulated by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission ("ICC"). It focuses on changes in the past quarter-
century in administrative regulation of entry, rates, and serv-
ice in the railroad and trucking industries. This Part describes
the ultimate demise of the ICC at the hands of Congress at the
end of 1995, and Congress's simultaneous creation of the Sur-
face Transportation Board ("STB").
Part II undertakes a similar inquiry concerning the tele-
communications industry. Specifically, it discusses the extent
to which FCC control over entry, rates, and service continues in
its historical form or, instead, has given way to other ap-
proaches. This Part also describes the FCC's recent and ongo-
ing efforts to remake the agency so that, despite the decline of
D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act:
Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395,
1412-20 (1999).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 18, and 47 U.S.C.).
4. A colleague and I have described these sweeping changes in regulated in-
dustries law and have suggested some of their causes. See Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
1154 [V01.71
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its historically most important functions, the agency has a con-
tinuing role to play.
Finally, Part III of the article attempts to peer into the fu-
ture of the FCC. Based on the accounts in Parts I and II, this
Part suggests that there are three possible futures for the FCC.
First, Congress may abolish the agency. The possibility of abo-
lition or termination can no longer be dismissed out of hand for
several reasons. Most notably, there have been a number of re-
cent high-profile calls to abolish the FCC; the increasing em-
phasis on competition in telecommunications regulation has
called into question some of the most important premises upon
which the FCC was founded; and Congress has taken a largely
abolitionist approach to regulatory reform in some other indus-
tries (such as trucking, where the STB did not succeed to the
ICC's most important powers over that industry).
A second possibility is that Congress may reduce the FCC's
authority without formally abolishing the agency. This sce-
nario finds support in Congress's actions with regard to the
railroad industry, where the legislature gave the STB only
some of the same regulatory authority that the ICC had pos-
sessed, most notably where there were continuing concerns
about monopoly control by the railroads.
A final possible future is that the agency may succeed in
its effort to stave off the first or second scenarios-legislative
abolition or reduction-by reinventing itself. The FCC then
would continue to possess most of the same formal authority
that it has traditionally held, but would exercise its most intru-
sive powers, such as rate regulation, only in areas where there
were continuing concerns about monopoly power.
The article concludes that, while there is some support for
each of these hypotheses and while the premises of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 would most strongly support
agency abolition, the FCC's future is most likely to consist of
some combination of agency reduction and agency reinvention.
In short, to the extent that the FCC staves off abolition, it will
largely be because the agency itself will have gone a long way
towards effectively reducing its own powers.
20001 1155
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I. THE DEMISE OF THE ICC AND THE CREATION OF THE STB
The ICC was laid to rest on January 1, 1996.' In some
senses, its burial was overdue. In the preceding twenty years,
Congress had removed or altered important aspects of the
ICC's authority to regulate the railroad and motor carrier in-
dustries. Certainly the ICC that remained, even before its
termination, was not the equal of the ICC of previous genera-
tions in terms of power or importance. In other senses, how-
ever, the ICC's demise was overstated, for this regulatory
commission left behind an heir. In the same act in which it
terminated the ICC, Congress created a new regulatory agency:
the Surface Transportation Board. Congress fashioned the
STB as an independent agency "within the Department of
Transportation."6 Succeeding to some of the ICC's authority,
the STB carries on aspects of its forebear's work.
This Part describes both the gradual diminution of the
ICC's powers, beginning in the 1970s, and the extent of the ju-
risdiction Congress granted to the STB upon the ICC's termi-
nation at the end of 1995. 7 It looks at the decline of the ICC by
5. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
6. 49 U.S.C. § 701(a) (Supp. III 1997) (creating STB within DOT); id.
§ 703(c) (providing for STB independence from DOT). The STB resembles the ICC
and other independent agencies in certain usual aspects. For example, there is an
odd number of members (specifically, three), who are appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and no more than a bare majority may
be from the same political party. See id. § 701(b)(1), (2). Even more directly, the
ICC members serving unexpired terms as of the date that the ICC was terminated
automatically became members of the STB. See id. § 701(b)(4).
7. No effort is made here to replicate all of the previous scholarship on the
ICC, or even that touching upon the past several decades. As the "granddaddy" of
regulatory commissions, the ICC has received its substantial share of academic
attention since its creation in 1887. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379,
387 (creating ICC); see, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW, 1836-1937 (1991); GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-
1916 (1965); RICHARD D. STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND
THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF REGULATORY POLICY (1991); Clyde B.
Aitchison, The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act: 1887-1937, 5 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 289 (1937); Thomas W. Gilligan et al., Regulation and the Theory
of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 32 J.L. & ECON. 35
(1989); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the
Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039,
1057-59 & nn.52-66 (1997) (discussing legal literature from the 1950s that as-
sessed the performance of the ICC and other agencies). The foregoing citations
only scratch the surface of the legal, economic, and political science literature dis-
cussing the ICC. The agency's lingering demise in the decade or two leading up to
1156 [V01. 71
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considering changes in its historically most important func-
tions.' In this way, it will be possible later in the article to
draw inferences about the likely future of the FCC.
A. Regulation of Entry and Exit
Regulatory agencies in the original paradigm of regulated
industries law possessed a number of characteristic functions.
The first was that "the regulatory agency would make the ini-
tial and central determination of whether companies would be
permitted to enter the industry." Correlative to this was the
agency's authority to determine whether to permit exit from
the industry.
The ICC provided not only the original instance of such
authority but also some of its most extensive uses. As amended
in 1920, the Interstate Commerce Act gave the agency the
authority to determine whether or not construction of an inter-
1996 is no exception to the wealth of scholarship on the agency. Academics have
variously described the political battles and events that culminated in the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, and the contemporaneous
Staggers Rail Act, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980), see, e.g., MARTHA
DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION passim (1985);
William E. Thoms, Rollin' On... To a Free Market: Motor Carrier Regulation
1935-1980, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 43 (1983), the extent of the ICC's own receptivity to
regulatory reform in the years after 1980, see, e.g., Richard D. Stone, Administra-
tive Deregulation of the Railroads: The ICC's Change of Philosophy, 61 TRANSP.
PRAC. J. 278 (1994), and other, broader matters, see, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Transportation Deregulation-On a Collision Course?, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 329 (1984);
Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission-Disintegration of
an American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1984). Less attention has
been given to the forces that resulted in the agency's ultimate termination. This
may be attributed to the recentness of that event or, alternatively, to the "pro-
nounced tendency in legal scholarship to concentrate on potential or impending
additions to the corpus of legal regulation" and not on apparent subtractions
therefrom. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1408 (characterizing this as a ra-
tional approach but noting its costs).
8. The approach taken in this symposium article of looking more closely at
the evolving role of the federal regulators in the transportation and telecommuni-
cations industries (i.e., the ICC/STB and the FCC) is only one way of examining
the great transformation of regulated industries law. See Kearney & Merrill, su-
pra note 4, at 1330 (proposing to examine "changes in relations between providers
and end-users, changes in relations between providers, and changes in the role of
the regulators"). An interest in projecting the future role of the FCC recommends
a focus on the regulators. For an explanation of the federal focus, see id. at 1334
n.39.
9. Id. at 1359. The agencies' other characteristic functions are considered
in Parts I.B through I.D, infra.
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state railroad or abandonment of an existing line would serve
the "present or future public convenience and necessity."'0
More importantly, given the changing nature of the transporta-
tion industry as the twentieth century wore on, the ICC pos-
sessed similar authority with regard to the entry of individual
motor carriers into the industry."
In both contexts, the ICC was sparing in the permission
that it granted. In the motor carrier industry, for example,
there were approximately 14,000 ICC-licensed carriers in 1980,
"almost all descended from the 28,000 carriers that received
grandfather authority when the [original] Motor Carrier Act
took effect in 1935."12 Congress sought to reduce the ICC's con-
trol over motor carrier entry long before it eliminated the ICC.
With regard to this industry, where no technological basis
naturally restricted entry, Congress proceeded through the Mo-
tor Carrier Act of 1980. It slightly altered the statutory lan-
guage, so that instead of an applicant's having to show that its
entry was "required by the present or future public convenience
and necessity," 3 the ICC had to permit entry unless it con-
cluded that such entry was "inconsistent with the public con-
venience and necessity."14 This change proved sufficient: the
number of motor carriers with ICC operating authority in-
creased from 18,045 in 1980 to 36,948 in 1986.1
10. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 477-78; see 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(18) (1976) (repealed).
11. See Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, §§ 206, 207, 49 Stat. 543, 551
(codified as amended and before repeal at 49 U.S.C. §§ 306, 307 (1976)) (prohibit-
ing interstate motor vehicle common carriage without ICC certificate of public
convenience and necessity and providing that seeker of such certificate had to
demonstrate, inter alia, "that the proposed service ... is or will be required by the
present or future public convenience and necessity"). For a demonstration of the
increasing importance of motor carrier traffic over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury, see CLIFFORD WINSTON ET AL., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SURFACE
FREIGHT DEREGULATION 1-2 (1990).
12. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 226 (1982).
13. 49 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976) (repealed) (providing that applicant must dem-
onstrate that certificate "is or will be required by the present or future public con-
venience and necessity").
14. 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b)(1) (1982) (repealed) (providing that ICC "shall issue
a certificate" authorizing motor carrier transportation "unless the Commission
finds, on the basis of evidence presented by persons objecting to the issuance of a
certificate, that the transportation to be authorized by the certificate is inconsis-
tent with the public convenience and necessity"). This change in language also
shifted the burden from the applicant to those opposed to an application.
15. See WINSTON ETAL., supra note 11, at 11-12.
[Vol.71
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In the rail context, the problem prompting reform was not
entry but exit. Carriers were eager to get rid of unprofitable
lines.16 Although the statistics concerning railroad abandon-
ments are not as stark as the statistics regarding the limited
entry into motor carriage, the ICC was reluctant to order
abandonment where a railroad's petition was protested, and
overall the agency acted as a brake on abandonments.17 As one
observer stated after surveying the ICC's exit decisions in the
rail industry, "[tihere is plenty of evidence that before 1976 the
ICC would not allow route abandonments, even by failing car-
riers, if there was any significant protest from shippers or local
governments."" These determinations nonetheless required
substantial attention from the ICC, with some petitions for
abandonment of rail lines lingering for years in the agency
even before judicial review.' 9
Congress took a series of steps to reduce but not eliminate
agency control over abandonment of rail lines. The Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,20 better
known as the "4R Act," provided that railroads could not be
forced to continue service on unprofitable lines, established
timetables for agency action on railroads' abandonment re-
quests, and authorized subsidies for the continuation of some
lines.2' The landmark Staggers Rail Act of 198022 further con-
16. See, e.g., ANN F. FRIEDLAENDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT
REGULATION 184 (1969) ("Stressing the need for abandonment, one participant [in
a 1967 conference on freight transport regulation] quoted the president of a large
midwestern railroad, who said that if he had the freedom he would get rid of one-
third of his miles of track."); cf William E. Thorns, Clear Track for Deregulation-
American Railroads, 1970-1980, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 183, 210 (1982) (contrasting
trucking and airline industries, where order of the day was new entrants trying to
get into the business, with the railroad industry, where "[riegulatory freedom...
meant freedom to merge, freedom to abandon trackage, and freedom to change
(usually raise) rates").
17. See MICHAEL CONANT, RAILROAD MERGERS AND ABANDONMENTS 113-15
(1964). For a helpful summary of the various commentators' views, including Co-
nant's, see Steven R. Wild, A History of Railroad Abandonments, 23 TRANSP. L.J.
1, 5 & nn.25-28 (1995).
18. THEODORE KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 (1983).
19. See William G. Mahoney, The Interstate Commerce Commission/Surface
Transportation Board as Regulator of Labor's Rights and Deregulator of Rail-
roads' Obligations: The Contrived Collision of the Interstate Commerce Act with
the Railway Labor Act, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 241, 262 (1997); STONE, supra note 7, at
97.
20. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976).
21. See id. §§ 802, 809, 90 Stat. 127, 146 (codified as amended and before
repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1976)); KEELER, supra note 18, at 34. Even prior to
1.159
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strained the ICC's actions on abandonment applications. As a
substantive matter, the 1980 Staggers Act permitted railroads
leeway to invoke economic grounds in support of an abandon-
ment.23 Procedurally, it required, among other things, that the
ICC render a decision on a proposed abandonment within 255
days. 2
4
The anticipated results followed. "Facing far less opposi-
tion from the ICC, railroads abandoned thousands of miles of
track, selling some of it to the smaller regional and local or
'short-line' railroads. In 1979 Class I railroads owned 277,242
miles of track; by 1987 this figure had fallen to 220,518. "25
With regard to the foregoing entry-and-exit issues, the
STB largely inherited the authority that the ICC had held im-
mediately prior to its termination. As to railroads, this means
that the STB has the authority over the creation of a new line
or extension of an existing one, and must issue a certificate be-
fore such activity may go forward. Congress sought to ensure,
however, that the STB would not stand in the way of reason-
able railroad development. It required the STB to issue the
1976, the "3R Act" (the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974)) had spoken to abandonments of lines in the northeastern
portion of the county. Specifically, the 3R Act created an agency (the United
States Railway Association) whose mandate included determining which compo-
nents of the northeastern railway system should be maintained and whose net
effect was that the "publicly owned corporation (Conrail), arising from the Penn
Central and several other bankrupt roads in the Northeast, contained 3000 route-
miles less than its [predecessors'] lines." KEELER, supra note 18, at 33.
22. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
23. See id. §§ 101(a), 402, 94 Stat. 1897-98, 1941-45 (codified as amended
and before repeal at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1010la(3), (6), (10), 10905 (1994)) (recognizing
need for compensatory return on investment); KEELER, supra note 18, at 101-02.
24. See Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 402(b)(3), 94 Stat. 1941-42 (1980) (codified as
amended and before repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 10904(c)(3) (1994)). The Staggers Act
also contained a forced-sale or cramdown provision, under which a railroad seek-
ing to abandon a line could be required-either under negotiated terms or, failing
that, terms set by the ICC-to permit the purchase or subsidy of the line. See id.
§ 402(c), 94 Stat. 1942-45 (1980) (codified as amended and before repeal at 49
U.S.C. § 10905 (1994)). For a description of this provision, see Wild, supra note
17, at 9-10. Although the focus here (as in the act) is on abandonments, the Stag-
gers Act also acted to facilitate railroad entry. Specifically, it restricted the ability
of an existing railroad to block another's construction or extension of a line by re-
fusing to permit the second carrier to cross its property. See Pub. L. No. 96-448,
§ 221(b), 94 Stat. 1928 (1980) (codified before repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 10901(d)
(1994)).
25. WINSTON ETAL., supra note 11, at 11.
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certificate unless the STB "finds that such activities are incon-
sistent with the public convenience and necessity."26
As would be expected, Congress has proved less friendly to
the railroads with regard to exit from the industry. Railroads
seeking to abandon or discontinue lines must apply to the STB.
The STB is to approve an application "only if the [STB finds
that the present or future public convenience and necessity re-
quire or permit the abandonment or discontinuance." 27  This
standard, which places the burden on the railroad, is essen-
tially the same standard as that which long governed the
ICC.2 S Of course, many of the various reforms relating to appli-
cations to abandon or discontinue rail service that were imple-
mented in the 4R Act and Staggers Act now govern proceedings
before the STB.29
As to motor carriers, the STB's powers are more limited
than they are over railroads, and certainly do not rival the
ICC's authority under the original paradigm of regulated in-
dustries law. Indeed, Congress ultimately eliminated regula-
tory control over entry into the motor carrier industry when it
enacted the ICC Termination Act, removing what essentially
had become by then a mere licensing requirement.3" It is true
that this Act imposed a requirement that most motor common
carriers register with the Secretary of Transportation, though
not with the STB itself. 1 The Secretary, however, is required
to register-that is, has no discretion not to register-any per-
son so long as the person is willing and able to comply with the
Department of Transportation's and the STB's regulations, in-
cluding the Department's safety regulations, and with certain
26. 49 U.S.C. § 10901(c) (Supp. III 1997).
27. Id. § 10903(d). The STB is specifically directed to "consider whether the
abandonment or discontinuance will have a serious, adverse impact on rural and
community development." Id.
28. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10903(a) (1994) (repealed) (providing for abandon-
ment or discontinuance only upon ICC finding that "the present or future public
convenience and necessity require or permit the abandonment or discontinu-
ance"); 49 U.S.C. § la(1) (1976) (repealed) (essentially identical provision).
29. Compare, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10904 (Supp. III 1997) with supra text accom-
panying notes 20-24.
30. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 102(a), 103, 109
Stat. 803, 804, 852 (1995) (repealing, inter alia, 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b), (c) (1994)).
31. See id. § 103, 109 Stat. 879-90 (1995) (codified in relevant part at 49
U.S.C. §§ 13901-13908 (Supp. III 1997)).
1161
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minimum financial responsibility requirements established by
the Department.32
At the end of the day, it is plain that the transformation of
transportation law has included a fundamental reworking of
administrative control over entry and exit. Even in areas
where Congress preserved some agency authority (for example,
on the matter of abandonment of railroad lines), it limited
regulatory discretion, both in terms of procedure (how long the
agency might take) and substance (what factors the agency had
to consider). Moreover, in other areas (for example, entry into
the trucking business), Congress essentially eliminated agency
control altogether. Finally, while the ICC itself adopted some
aspects of these reforms before its termination, it should be
noted that Congress was the primary actor in these matters.
B. Regulatory Control Over Rates and Revenues
In the original paradigm of regulated industries law, the
other major distinguishing characteristics of administrative
agencies lay in their control over the rates that regulated com-
panies could charge, and the revenues that these companies
would accordingly receive.3" The ICC long fit comfortably
within this model. For example, the agency regulated, on a
cost-of-service basis, the rates that interstate railroads
charged.34 Although in many contexts regulatory agencies en-
gaged in maximum rate regulation, the ICC also superintended
the minimum rates charged by certain carriers, particularly
truckers.35
The shift from detailed rate regulation by the ICC in the
railroad industry began with the decision to permit contract
rates. Perhaps no other change in transportation law was
more important. Traditionally, the ICC had taken the position
that contract rates were inherently discriminatory and there-
32. See 49 U.S.C. § 13902(a) (Supp. III 1997).
33. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1358-:59.
34. See FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 16, at 130-37.
35. Indeed, the ICC commenced this undertaking promptly after the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 gave it jurisdiction over the interstate trucking industry. See
Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers-Continuity and Disintegration in U.S.
Transportation Law, 13 TRANsP. L.J. 1, 29 n.173 (1983) (citing ICC administra-
tive decisions).
[Vol.71
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fore must be "deemed unlawful per se."36 In the late 1970s, the
ICC abandoned this position. 7 In 1980, Congress codified the
ICC's new policy in the Staggers Act.3" Although the Staggers
Act required railroads to file their contracts with the ICC, the
agency could disapprove those contracts only if the rates dis-
criminated against a port, or contained requirements that ef-
fectively rendered a railroad unable to meet its common carrier
obligations to other shippers.39 Further, once it had approved
the contracts, the ICC could interfere with them only in time of
war.4" Operating under an approved contract, the railroad was
exempted from the general prohibition on discrimination.41
Contract rates proliferated after the 1980 enactment of the
Staggers Act. Railroads and shippers negotiated thousands of
rates for a wide variety of commodities.4 2 By 1990, a decade af-
ter the Staggers Act's passage, the Association of American
Railroads estimated that "more than half of all rail traffic is
currently shipped under some form of contract rate. 43
The ICC Termination Act in the mid-1990s continued the
trend toward detariffing and reduced agency control over rates
and revenues. Congress retained agency authority to oversee
the reasonableness of rail rates for common carrier service, 44
but it eliminated the requirement that rates be filed in tariffs.
Instead, it provided that dominant carriers, defined explicitly
as carriers with market power, "shall establish reasonable...
rates"-language reminiscent of, but not identical to, the tariff-
filing requirement.45 The ICC Termination Act also continued
36. See Guaranteed Rates, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, to Chicago, 315 I.C.C.
311, 323 (1961).
37. See Change of Policy, Railroad Contract Rates, 361 I.C.C. 205 (1.979)
(denying petition for rulemaking); Change of Policy, Railroad Contract Rates, Ex
Parte No. 358-F (I.C.C. Nov. 9, 1978) (adopting general policy statement).
38. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 208, 94 Stat. 1895, 1908
(codified as amended and before repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 10713(a) (1994)).
39. See 49 U.S.C. § 10713(d)(2)(A) (1994) (repealed).
40. See id. §§ 10713(g), 11128 (repealed).
41. See id. §§ 10713(h), 10741(f), 11101(a) (repealed).
42. See WINSTON ET AL., supra note 11, at 11.
43. Id.
44. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701 (Supp. III 1997).
45. Compare id. § 10702 ("[a] rail carrier providing transportation or service
subject to the jurisdiction of the [STBI shall establish reasonable ... rates") (em-
phasis added) with, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10762(a)(1) (1994) (repealed) ("[a] carrier pro-
viding transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the [ICC] shall pub-
lish and file with the [ICC] tariffs containing [its] rates") and 49 U.S.C. § 6(1)
(1976) (repealed) ("[e]very common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter
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HeinOnline  -- 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1163 2000
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
the general scheme under which railroads could contract with
shippers to provide transportation instead of providing common
carrier service. 46 The STB may review such contracts under a
narrow set of circumstances, as the ICC previously could, but
unless the agency holds a contract unlawful, the .transportation
proceeds under the contract and is not subject to agency over-
sight.47
Similar developments-in terms of contract rates and de-
tariffing--occurred in the trucking industry in the 1980s and
1990s. For example, having already sharply reduced the re-
quirement that motor carriers file tariffs, Congress eliminated
that requirement for virtually all trucking traffic when it ter-
minated the ICC. 4' Tariffs remain only for movements by or
with a water carrier in noncontiguous domestic trade and for
movements of household goods paid for by the household con-
sumer.49 Indeed, "only in the former case must the tariffs actu-
ally be filed with the Surface Transportation Board, the ICC's
limited successor; for the latter traffic category, the 'tariffs'
need merely be available for inspection by the Board or by
shippers."50
In sum, regulatory control over rates and revenues in the
transportation industries has given way to an even greater ex-
tent than regulatory control over entry and exit. There can be
no rate regulation without tariffs, and the tariffing require-
ment has been largely abolished in one industry (trucking) and
substantially scaled back in another (railroads). A contract re-
gime now predominates instead.
C. Regulation of Type and Amount of Service
The ICC also possessed the traditional agency authority to
"'regulat[e] the type or amount of a product or service of-
shall file with the [ICC] and print and keep open to public inspection schedules
showing all the rates, fares, and charges for transportation").
46. See 49 U.S.C. § 10709 (Supp. III 1997).
47. See id. § 10709(b), (c)(1), (g).
48. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1337 & nn.57-58 (and sources
cited therein).
49. See id.
50. Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 13702 (Supp. III 1997).
1164 [Vol.71
HeinOnline  -- 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1164 2000
2000] WILL THE FCC GO THE WAY OF THE ICC?
fered."'51 No statute directly granted the ICC this power.
Rather, the authority flowed primarily from the agency's abil-
ity to reject rates or practices contained in tariffs if it concluded
that they were not just, reasonable, or non-discriminatory, and
also stemmed from the agency's authority to regulate entry.
As Professor Ann Friedlaender suggested some time ago,
the controversy over the "Big John" railroad car provides an in-
structive example of regulatory control.52 The Big John car was
a substantial technological innovation that the Southern Rail-
way attempted to introduce in 1961. The car had a capacity
twice that of a traditional boxcar and a substantially lower
weight. Southern introduced the car in 1961, but the lower
rates for this service were immediately challenged and sus-
pended by the ICC.53 It was not until four years later in 1965,
after protracted litigation including two separate Supreme
Court decisions, "[that] the railroad [was] able to use the Big
John cars freely." 4
The rise of contract carriage substantially eliminated the
ICC's (and the successor STB's) ability to engage in this kind of
51. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1359 (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 1 (3d ed. 1994)). In most in-
dustries, this power belongs to the market, not to a government regulator.
52. See FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 16, at 92-94, 178.
53. The lower rates were essential to Southern, for the entire purpose of the
Big John car was to make it economically feasible for the railroad to compete with
barges and trucks for grain traffic.
54. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 16, at 93. Two lengthy legal battles are rele-
vant. In the first, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the ICC had exclusive
authority to suspend railroad rates and therefore that, after the agency had exer-
cised that authority by suspending the Southern's rates for the maximum period
permitted by Congress, the federal courts lacked authority to issue an injunction
against the rates. See Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963).
The second battle then commenced when Southern put the new rates into effect.
The ICC ruled that the railroad must raise its rates, but this decision was over-
turned in the courts. See Grain in Multiple-Car Shipments-River Crossings to
S., 318 I.C.C. 641 (Div. 2), rev'd, 321 I.C.C. 582 (1963) (full Commission), rev'd sub
nom. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Arrow Transp. Co., 229 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.
Ohio 1964), vacated sub nom. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry.,
379 U.S. 642, on remand, 325 I.C.C. 752 (1965). Although the railroad put the
rates into effect after the first battle ended and defeated the agency's attempt to
enjoin the rates in the second, not only were the rates not effective during the
pendency of the first battle, but even thereafter, as Friedlaender notes, "the
Southern was operating the cars and investing in them without knowing whether
the rates on which their profitability was based would ultimately be accepted."
FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 16, at 93.
1.165
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oversight and control.5" In essence, under a contract regime,
the carrier and the shipper alone are the relevant parties to the
transaction, as is the case in most industries. This was not the
case, however, under a tariff regime, in which other interests
might seek to involve the agency. Further, while current law
provides for agency review of carrier-shipper contracts, this
provision is limited. First, the general rule is that the only en-
tities authorized to seek review are shippers that "individually
will be harmed because the proposed contract unduly impairs
the ability of the contracting rail carrier or carriers to meet
their common carrier obligations to the complainant," 6 or a
port that "individually will be harmed because the proposed
contract will result in unreasonable discrimination against
such port." 7 Second, as this statutory language indicates, the
grounds on which the STB may disapprove railroad-shipper
contracts are also circumscribed. Finally, the time for any
challenge is limited. A challenger must act within thirty days
of the railroad's filing a summary of the contract with the STB,
and Congress specifically has forbidden subsequent challenge
to the contract on almost any ground."
These various congressional actions, beginning with the
Staggers Act in 1980 and continuing through the ICC Termina-
tion Act of 1995, have permitted contractual arrangements be-
tween carriers and shippers and have limited, in several impor-
tant ways, the possibilities for challenging those arrangements.
This has had profound effects on the agency's ability to super-
intend the type and amount of service provided by carriers.
Certainly most disputes such as the "Big John" controversy
could not recur, for the challengers of railroad practices tended
to be either the ICC itself, acting sua sponte, or the railroads'
competitors (most notably truckers but also barge lines)-and
in either instance the mechanism for the challenge would be
the suspension of (or a petition to suspend) the railroad's tariff.
The large-scale elimination of railroad tariffs has thus substan-
tially eradicated the possibility of such challenges. The virtual
abolition of tariffs in the trucking industry similarly has re-
55. See supra Part I.B (describing administrative and legislative determina-
tions to permit contractual relationships between carriers and shippers).
56. 49 U.S.C. § 10709(g)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (Supp. III 1997).
57. Id.
58. See id. § 10709(c)(1).
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duced the possibility of general agency regulation of service in
that industry.59
D. Other Regulatory Authority
The ICC also possessed a myriad of other powers with
which to superintend the railroad and motor carrier industries.
One of the most significant was the requirement that the
agency approve any change in control of firms within its juris-
diction. Thus, all railroad mergers, for example, had to be ap-
proved by the ICC.6 ° The ICC faced a great deal of criticism in
this context. As Lawrence White has stated, "[i]n the previous
two decades [leading up to 1980] the ICC-often because of its
concerns about balancing the demands of various constituen-
cies-had sometimes taken years to decide the fate of merg-
ers."61  The most notorious example was the Union Pacific's
proposed merger with the Rock Island railroad. The proposed
merger, as one observer has succinctly stated, "languished for
ten years before the ICC, until everyone lost interest and the
Rock itself was liquidated."62
59. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (describing limited re-
quirement of trucking tariffs).
60. See generally FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 16, at 138-41, 167-68, 184-85,
187.
61. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE DEREGULATION OF THE TELEPHONE
INDUSTRY: THE LESSONS FROM THE U.S. RAILROAD DEREGULATION EXPERIENCE
15 n.29 (New York Univ. Center for Law and Bus. Working Paper No. 98-016,
1998), available at SSRN Electronic Library - Abstract and Paper Download -
WHITE Paper (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.
taf?ABSTRACTID=164497>.
62. Thorns, supra note 16, at 211; see also Larry Kaufman, UP's Play for
CNW: From a Slam Dunk to a Tight Game, J. COM., May 5, 1993, at 2B (briefly
recounting course of the Rock Island merger case). ICC approval of motor carrier
mergers was also required, originally for instances in which more than twenty ve-
hicles were involved, see Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, § 1, 49 Stat. 543 (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 5(10) (1964)), and beginning in 1965 for carriers
whose combined annual gross revenues totalled $300,000 or more, see Pub. L. No.
89-93, § 1, 79 Stat. 284 (1965) (codified as amended and before repeal at 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(10) (1970) and 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1976)). See generally Dale G. Anderson &
Ray C. Hutsell, Jr., Trucking Regulation, 1935-1980, in REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION OF THE MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY 34 (John Richard Felton &
Dale G. Anderson eds., 1989). Inasmuch as mergers helped solve some of the
problems caused by the agency's restrictive policies concerning entry, the ICC ac-
tively encouraged mergers in the years between 1935 and 1980. See id. at 34-35.
See generally JAMES C. JOHNSON, TRUCKING MERGERS: A REGULATORY
VIEWPOINT (1973).
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Congress intervened in this area of regulatory authority as
well. In the 4R Act, Congress itself specified the maximum
length of time that the ICC could spend on the various seg-
ments of merger review.13 This 1976 statute also established a
role for the Secretary of Transportation in considering merger
applications.64 The Staggers Act continued this reform process,
requiring, for example, that the ICC make a determination on
proposed mergers within 300 days of a request for approval.65
Although the STB does not possess the full panoply of
powers that the ICC once enjoyed over the railroad and motor
carrier industries, Congress did bestow upon, the STB the same
basic authority to review mergers of railroads that the ICC had
possessed.66 In this regard, it is noteworthy that approval of a
merger by the STB immunizes the transaction from the anti-
trust laws.67 Specifically, a rail merger may proceed so long as
the STB determines that it is "consistent with the public inter-
est."6' The STB may, short of blocking the merger, permit the
merger contingent upon conditions such as the divestiture of
parallel tracks or the granting of tracking rights and access to
other facilities.
69
63. See Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-210, § 402(b), 90 Stat. 62 (codified before repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1976)).
64. See id. § 401, 90 Stat. 61-62 (1976) (codified before repeal at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (1976)); see also id. § 403, 90 Stat. 63-66 (1976) (codified before repeal at
49 U.S.C. § 5(3) (1976)) (providing expedited railroad merger procedure and giving
role to the Secretary of Transportation).
65. See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 228(d), 94 Stat.
1931-32 (codified before repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 11345 (1994)).
66. This was not an inevitable policy choice by Congress. When Congress
eliminated the Civil Aeronautics Board, it initially transferred authority over
mergers to the Department of Transportation. See Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 26, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified before repeal at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378(b)(1)(A), (B) (1988)). Congress subsequently permitted this authority to
expire, which had the effect of shifting the authority to the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission. See Richard D. Cudahy, The FERC's Policy
on Electric Mergers: A Bit of Perspective, 18 ENERGY L.J. 113, 127 & n.76 (1997)
(and sources cited therein). Given the airline mergers that had occurred on the
Department of Transportation's watch, Judge Cudahy has termed this "a classic
case of closing the barn door long after the horse had escaped for good." Id. at
127.
67. See 49 U.S.C. § 11321(a) (Supp. III 1997). This is authority that the ICC
had possessed since the 1920 Transportation Act. See Northern Lines Merger
Cases, 396 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1970) (detailing history of provision); see also
Cudahy, supra note 66, at 124-30 & n.88 (discussing statutory approach to airline
and electricity mergers).
68. 49 U.S.C. § 11324(c) (Supp. III 1997).
69. See id.
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The STB has not been willing to require divestiture. For
example, in approving the proposed merger of the Union Pacific
and Southern Pacific in 1996, the STB was confronted with the
Department of Justice's proposal urging that approval of the
merger be conditioned on divestiture of more than a thousand
miles of track. ° The STB rejected this structural solution in
favor of regulation.7 The result of the ICC's and its successor's
permissive attitude toward rail mergers has been that, "since
the Staggers Act, the number of significant U.S. railways has
shrunk from 26 to 9," with the giants now reduced "to four
major roads-conceivably on their way to one."72
The foregoing account has described the state of traditional
regulation in the transportation industries as it has evolved in
the past quarter-century. The description should also make for
possible meaningful discussion of developments in telecommu-
nications regulation over the same general time period.
II. THE STATE OF THE FCC
For some time now, the FCC has occupied the ICC's former
status as the most important independent federal agency. The
agency was created in the Communications Act of 1934,1
3
largely as an amalgam of two agencies-the Federal Radio
Commission, which had regulated broadcasting in the United
States since 1927, 74 and that portion of the ICC that had regu-
latory authority over interstate telephone and telegraph com-
panies since 1910."8
A. The Extent of the Great Transformation in the Area of
Telecommunications Law
Telecommunications law has recently undergone a trans-
formation analogous to that which has occurred in transporta-
70. See Cudahy, supra note 66, at 129.
71. See Salvatore Massa, Injecting Competition in the Railroad Industry
Through Access, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 283, 295 (1999).
72. Cudahy, supra note 66, at 128, 135.
73. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-1021 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
74. See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
75. See Mann-Elkins Act, Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539,
544-45 (1910) (deeming interstate "telegraph, telephone, and cable companies" to
be "common carriers" subject to the ICC's jurisdiction).
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tion law. The transformation has consisted of a variety of ad-
ministrative, judicial, and legislative changes occurring over
the same general time period as the transformation in trans-
portation (viz., the past twenty-five or so years). Although
these changes previously have been discussed in overview,76 the
following describes more precisely the nature of the changes in
telecommunications regulation, and in particular, in the role of
the FCC.77
1. Regulation of Entry and Exit
The FCC always has possessed regulatory authority to
control both entry into and departure from the interstate tele-
communications industry. Congress bestowed the former
power in section 214(a) of the Communications Act of 1934,
which prohibits would-be competitors from entering the inter-
state market "unless and until there shall first have been ob-
tained from the Commission a certificate that the present and
future public convenience and necessity require or will require
[such entry]. " 78 As the FCC has succinctly stated of this provi-
sion's purpose, "Congress enacted the section 214(a) entry certi-
fication requirements to prevent useless duplication of facilities
that could result in increased rates being imposed on captive
telephone ratepayers."79  The latter power-to control exit-
was added a short time later.8 0 Section 214(a) did not change
in any material respect until Congress enacted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"). 1
76. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1329-64.
77. Cf. supra note 8. This article does not recount the FCC's gradual elimi-
nation of its regulation of the provision of customer premises equipment. See
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1340-42 (describing in detail the development
of the requirement that carriers "unbundle" provision of service and provision of
equipment).
78. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1994).
79. Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 11,364, 11,366 & n.9 (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 10314 (1934) (re-
marks of Rep. Rayburn)).
80. See 57 Stat. 11 (1943) (amending section 214 to provide further that
"[n)o carrier shall discontinue, reduce, or impair service to a community, or part of
a community, unless and until there shall first have obtained from the Commis-
sion a certificate that neither the present nor future public convenience and ne-
cessity will be adversely affected thereby").
81. See infra note 84 (describing Congress's 1996 insertion of provision else-
where in Communications Act eliminating requirement of section 214 certificate
for video programming).
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Notwithstanding section 214's static state for more than
six decades, the law and regulation concerning entry and exit
in interstate telecommunications changed dramatically during
this time. The bulk of these changes occurred in the 1970s. Af-
ter MCI and other "specialized common carriers" had obtained
approval from the FCC to provide private-line services (essen-
tially, a dedicated connection between two fixed points), MCI
sought to expand its services to compete head to head with
AT&T's basic long-distance service. In its so-called Execunet
ruling, the D.C. Circuit ultimately held that the FCC, having
permitted MCI into one part of the interstate telecommunica-
tions business, could not artificially cordon it off from other
parts unless the agency was willing explicitly to conclude that
an AT&T monopoly in long-distance telecommunications was
required by the public interest.82 This series of administrative
and judicial proceedings has received substantial attention.83
Since that time, the FCC has not sought categorically to
prohibit entry into interstate telecommunications. The agency
also has taken administrative action to reduce the need for ad-
ditional section 214 applications. For example, the FCC re-
cently granted "would-be" carriers blanket authority under sec-
tion 214 to operate new telecommunications facilities, provided
that they obtain the FCC's authorization to use any radio fre-
quencies associated with their networks, as required under Ti-
tle III of the Communications Act. 4 Although the details vary,
82. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365,380 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
83. See, e.g., PETER HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
§§ 9.3.5-9.4.2, at 748-56 (1999); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1343, 1374-
75; Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 524 (1988).
84. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.01 (1998); 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303, 307-309 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997); Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. at 11,365-66, 11,372-75; see also Application of MCI
Communications Corp., Transferor, and So. Pac. Telecomms. Corp., Transferee,
for Consent to Transfer Control of Qwest Comm'ns, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 7790, 7802-
03 & n.81 (1997) (and authorities cited therein). Congress itself provided in
section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act that "the Commission shall
permit any common carrier to be exempt from the requirements of Section 214 of
the Communications Act of 1934 for the extension of any line." 47 U.S.C. § 214
note (Supp. III 1997). It also eliminated the need for a section 214 certificate for
telephone company operation of a cable television system. See id. § 571(c) (stating
that"[a] common carrier shall not be required to obtain a certificate under section
214 with respect to the establishment or operation of a system for the delivery of
video programming").
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the FCC has made the granting of section 214 exit authority
similarly automatic. 85
This is not to suggest that the agency's entry-and-exit
authority under section 214(a) has become irrelevant. First,
the formal requirement of a section 214 certificate remains.6
Second, and more importantly, in cases of mergers or changes
in corporate control, the FCC engages in an extensive practice
of conditioning its section 214 approval on a carrier's agreeing
to certain provisions or undertakings. For example, the FCC
conditioned its approval of MCI's transfer of its section 214 cer-
tificates to WorldCom, Inc., which was required to complete the
companies' recent merger, on MCI's divestiture of its internet
assets.8 7 Similarly, in approving NYNEX's transfer of its sec-
tion 214 certificates to Bell Atlantic, a necessary component of
those companies' merger, the FCC imposed a variety of condi-
tions on the merged companies' operations, particularly in or-
der to ensure that other companies could compete for local
business.8 8 It is well settled that the FCC's determination of
whether a transaction would serve the public interest is not
85. See Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. at 11,378-81. The FCC rejected the contention that vari-
ous classes of carriers-e.g., rate-of-return LECs and price-cap LECs-should be
excluded from this liberalization of the agency's section 214 policies. See id. at
11372-74.
86. See, e.g., International Authorizations Granted, Rel. No. DA 99-2058,
1999 FCC LEXIS 4846 (Oct. 1, 1999) (issuing public notice that "serves as each
[listed] newly authorized carrier's Section 214 certificate" and noting that "[i]t
contains general and specific conditions"). The FCC recently rejected a proposal
that it "forbear from exercising [its] section 214 jurisdiction." Implementation of
Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. at 11,372.
This proposal had been made pursuant to section 10(a) of the Telecommunications
Act, which requires the FCC to "forbear from enforcing provisions of the [Commu-
nications] Act when it finds that: (1) enforcement is not necessary to ensure that
prices are just and reasonable and not unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforce-
ment is not necessary to protect consumers; and (3) forbearance is consistent with
the public interest," with this last factor being specifically tied in part to whether
forbearance will increase competition. Id. at 11,370; see 47 U.S.C. § 160(a), (b)
(Supp. III 1997).
87. See Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corpora-
tion for Transfer of Control of MCI Communications Corporation to WorldCom,
Inc., 13 F.C.C.R. 18,025, 18,103-04, 18,109-15, 18,118, 18,153 (1998).
88. See Applications of NYNEX Corp. Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corpora-
tion Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its
Subsidiaries, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 19,993, 20,069-91, 20,097, 20,107-86 (1997).
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limited to traditional antitrust principles, but can encompass
factors other than effects on competition. 9
The FCC's practice of conditioning approval of section 214
certificate transfers has drawn some recent fire. One commis-
sioner testified before Congress as follows:
Finally, I express some general apprehension about the
"conditioning" of grants for license transfer applications and
section 214 authorizations. I think it is entirely appropri-
ate, under the Commission's organic statute, for the Com-
mission to condition license transfer and line extension ap-
plications on compliance with existing FCC rules or
statutory provisions....
All too often, however, this Commission places conditions
on license transfers that have no basis in the text of the
Communications Act. That is, the Commission requires
companies to do certain things-things that it could not for
lack of statutory authority require outright in a rulemak-
ing-as a quo for the quid of receiving a license. Again, this
represents a transgression of the Commission's statutory
limits and thus a violation of the [Administrative Procedure
Act] .90
Whatever the merits of this criticism, the FCC's use of its
section 214 certificate authority is an important part of current
telecommunications regulation. The FCC processes more than
500 section 214 applications each year.9 While many of these
are routine and uncontroversial, others such as the Bell Atlan-
tic/NYNEX application provoke substantial public concern. In-
deed, in the same order in which it extended blanket section
214 authority for the construction and operation of domestic
lines, the FCC refused to grant such a generic authorization for
89. See Satellite Business Systems, 62 F.C.C.2d 997, 1069, 1088 (1977), affd
sub nom. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
90. Testimony of Federal Communications Comm'r Harold W. Furchtgott-
Roth Before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, Sub-
comm. on Commercial and Administrative Law Oversight Hearing (May 25, 1999)
(citations omitted), attached to Separate Statement of Comm'r Harold Furchtgott-
Roth in Applications of Airtouch Communications, Inc. Transferor, and Vodafone
Group PLC Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authori-
zations, 14 F.C.C.R. 9430, 9474 (1999).
91. See The Commission's Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of
Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the Forfeiture Guidelines, 12 F.C.C.R.
17,087, 17,112 (1997).
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acquisitions of corporate control (as opposed to mere acquisi-
tions of assets). The FCC justified its position as follows:
Acquisitions of corporate control ... often raise serious pub-
lic interest concerns regarding the state of competition fol-
lowing the proposed acquisition or merger. Such acquisi-
tions are often contested and draw significant public
comments that we are bound to consider. We believe that
the magnitude of corporate acquisitions and their potential
effect on competition distinguishes them from acquisitions
of assets and has led us to conclude that corporate acquisi-
tions should not be covered by blanket authority.92
In short, the FCC no longer actively regulates exit and en-
try in the interstate market, but the provision granting the
agency such regulatory authority-section 214 of the Commu-
nications Act-has become the source of significant agency
authority over telecommunications mergers.
93
2. Regulatory Control Over Rates and Revenues
The FCC has moved away from the rate-of-return ra-
temaking that traditionally characterized regulated industries
law. Quite unlike the situation with regard to entry-and-exit
controls, where the FCC initially resisted liberalization, the
immediate impetuses for the move away from rate regulation
have come from within the FCC. Indeed, as far as government
institutions are concerned, the genesis and development of this
shift have been almost entirely administrative in nature, al-
though judicial resistance to one of its technical aspects (viz.,
detariffing) ultimately prompted congressional intervention on
the agency's side.
It is, of course, impossible to discuss the FCC's revised ap-
proach to ratemaking without referring to the changes in the
markets that the FCC regulates. 94 The most prominent devel-
opment of the last twenty-five years in telecommunications
services has been, without question, the development of a com-
petitive long-distance telecommunications market. In addition
92. Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 11,364, 11,374-75 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
93. I shall return to some issues involved in telecommunications mergers.
See infra Part II.A.4.
94. Cf. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1330, 1349.
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to the D.C. Circuit's Execunet ruling, events outside the regula-
tory sphere played a substantial role in prompting this devel-
opment. Most notable among these was the United States' an-
titrust action against AT&T, commenced in 1974, which
culminated in the breakup of the Bell System.95 The consent
decree resolving the litigation required AT&T to divest itself of
its local monopolies, known in the industry as the Bell Oper-
ating Companies ("BOCs") and to the public under familiar
names such as Illinois Bell and New York Telephone, and fur-
ther prohibited the divested BOCs from competing in the long-
distance market.96 The theory of the breakup, insofar as is
relevant here, was that real competition in the long-distance
market could not develop so long as one of the companies in the
market (AT&T) was vertically integrated with entities (the
BOCs) that possessed bottleneck control of facilities through
which all long-distance calls had to travel (the local ex-
changes). 97 Although it did not oppose the divestiture itself,
the FCC unsuccessfully opposed the consent decree's restric-
tions on the BOCs' post-divestiture activities.9
Notwithstanding its opposition to the Execunet decision
and to the AT&T decree's prohibition on BOC involvement in
long distance, the FCC deserves considerable credit for the
course of competition in the post-Execunet world. Part of the
story lies in how the FCC's control over rates and revenues has
evolved in the last quarter-century. In its regulation of MCI
and other AT&T competitors, the FCC did not attempt to im-
pose rate-of-return regulation. Such regulation had been the
historically dominant approach in telecommunications, as well
as in other public utility and common carrier industries.99
Rate-of-return regulation, however, was not dictated by the
95. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (approving
consent decree to settle government's lawsuit), affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). For a summary of the government's theories
and the key events in this lawsuit, see Kearney, supra note 2, at 1403-20.
96. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 160-70, 186-95 (explaining the divestiture
and the line-of-business restrictions); id. at 226-28 (setting forth provisions of
consent decree that imposed these requirements); Kearney, supra note 2, at 14.12-
20.
97. See Kearney, supra note 2, at 1403-05, 1409-16, 1420 (and sources cited
therein).
98. See id. at 1436 n.135 (and sources cited therein).
99. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 83, § 2.2.3, at 113-15; Kearney & Merrill,
supra note 4, at 1360-61.
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provisions of the Communications Act, which insists merely
that rates be "just and reasonable" and not unreasonably dis-
criminatory. 00 In light of MCI's and Sprint's fledgling status
as competitors of AT&T, the FCC could assume that a need to
compete with AT&T's rates, which were not similarly deregu-
lated, would keep these other companies' rates in line with the
statutory requirements.1 0 ' Indeed, beginning in 1985, the FCC
even attempted to forbid carriers other than AT&T from filing
tariffs containing their rates.102 While this particular attempt
was unsuccessful, the FCC did succeed for a time in adopting a
permissive approach under which these long-distance carriers
could file tariffs if they wished, but were not required to do so.
Tariffs being a sine qua non of rate-of-return regulation, this
gives some evidence of the FCC's unwillingness to control the
rates or revenues of carriers other than AT&T.
The FCC's approach to regulating AT&T's long-distance
services also evolved over this time period (the last quarter of
the twentieth century). In the 1970s, the FCC had devoted a
substantial amount of attention to questions involving rate
regulation of the Bell System, particularly in light of emerging
long-distance competition."' For example, in Docket No.
18128, the FCC considered the Bell System's various major
categories of interstate service and addressed numerous ques-
100. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (stating that rates must be just and rea-
sonable); id. § 202(a) (stating that rates may not be unreasonably discriminatory).
This classic formulation of "just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" pervades
regulated industries law and derives from the original Interstate Commerce Act.
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1330-34.
101. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Car-
rier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 324-26, 334-
35 (1979) (subsequent history omitted); see also id. at 324 & n.27 (noting that
these "other common carriers," as non-AT&T carriers were known, "generally
report very small or negative rates of return").
102. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Car-
rier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, vacated sub
nom. MCI v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Kearney & Merrill, su-
pra note 4, at 1337-39 (describing course of FCC's efforts at detariffing).
103. Prior to this time, until at least the mid-1960s, the FCC tended not to
superintend closely AT&T's rates. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 83, § 2.2.3, at
115 n.139 (citing Richard E. Wiley, The End of Monopoly: Regulatory Change and
the Promotion of Competition, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW 147, 148-
49 (Walter Sapronov ed. 1998)); Steven M. Spaeth, Industrial Policy, Continuing
Surveillance, and Raised Eyebrows: A Comparison of Informality in Administra-
tive Procedure in Japan and the United States, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 931, 940-45
(1994) (providing a helpful summary of the FCC's approach to its rate responsi-
bilities from 1934 to the mid-1960s and beyond).
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tions relevant to the Bell System's rate of return.14 Thereafter,
in its Competitive Carrier proceeding, commenced in 1979, the
FCC distinguished between dominant carriers and non-
dominant carriers. As the Supreme Court would characterize
the matter years later, "in the long-distance market, this
amounted to a distinction between AT&T and everyone else."10 5
The FCC then required dominant carriers (again, AT&T alone
in this context) to continue to file cost-support data for tariff
filings and to retain most of the trappings of rate regulation.
10 6
The FCC's major innovation in regulating AT&T was its
shift a decade later to a price-cap system of regulation. Under
such a system, the FCC sets a maximum price, and the carrier
then sets its rates at or below that ceiling. The theory is that,
because the price caps are not lowered if costs go down, the
carrier has a greater incentive than under traditional rate-of-
return regulation to act efficiently and closely monitor costs. 107
It is sufficient here to note that price-cap regulation constituted
a step away from classic rate-of-return regulation and close
agency superintendence of AT&T's rates. '
Finally, in 1995, the FCC acceded to AT&T's request to be
reclassified as a non-dominant carrier, like all of its competi-
104. See AT&T, Long Lines Dept., Revisions of Tariff FCC No. 260 Private
Line Servs., Series 5000 (TELPAK), 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976) (Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order), reconsid. granted in part and denied in part, 64 F.C.C.2d 971
(1977), further reconsid. granted in part and denied in part, 67 F.C.C.2d 1441
(1978), affd sub nom. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
105. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 221 (1994). A domestic
dominant carrier is defined as "a carrier found by the Commission to have market
power (i.e., the power to control prices)." 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(o) (1998); see also Im-
plementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14
F.C.C.R. 11,364, 11,367 n.10 (citing various FCC orders creating "dominant/non-
dominant" distinction and classifying various carriers).
106. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Car-
rier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 2, 33-35 (1980)
(subsequent history omitted).
107. I speak of "traditional" rate-of-return regulation because a price-cap
system is best viewed as a modified form of rate-of-return regulation that at-
tempts to create some otherwise absent incentives for the regulated company. Cf.
Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J.
ON REG. 325, 338 n.29 (1990). For a helpful and succinct exposition of the basic
theory of price caps, see National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 177-
79 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
108. For the details of price-cap regulation of AT&T, see Howard Griboff,
Comment, New Freedom for AT&T in the Competitive Long Distance Market, 44
FED. COMM. L.J. 435 (1992) (and sources cited therein).
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tors in the long-distance industry."°9 The consequence of this
ruling is that AT&T is free to price essentially all of its services
solely according to the market. Although the statutory re-
quirements that AT&T's (and all other carriers') rates be just,
reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory still remain,
the FCC has determined in piecemeal fashion over the last
twenty years that the existence of a competitive market struc-
ture means that the agency need not actively enforce these
guarantees.
The foregoing should not be taken as an indication that all
regulation of rates has disappeared from interstate telecom-
munications. The FCC continues to exercise relatively active
control over the rates that local exchange carriers ("LECs") can
charge long-distance and other service providers for affording
access to the LECs' end-users (e.g., both the calling and the
called party). Here, too, the FCC frequently employs a price-
cap system."0 The hope underlying much of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 is that sufficient competition will develop in
local telecommunications that this area of the industry will
witness a transformation similar to the one that occurred in
the long-distance segment over the last twenty-five years. If
this occurs, rate regulation of the LECs will cease.
3. Regulation of Type and Amount of Service
Historically, the FCC regulated in some respects the
amount and type of service that interstate telephone companies
offered. This traditional regulatory authority was less promi-
nent in the telecommunications industry than in some other
businesses. For example, in the context of the airline industry,
the policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") had a sub-
stantial effect on the number of flights operating on a daily ba-
sis from each airport.111 The differing nature of the telecom-
109. See Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Car-
rier, 11 F.C.C.R. 3271 (1995), reconsid. denied, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,787 (1997).
110. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4
F.C.C.R. 2873, 2877 (1989) (subsequent history omitted). For a brief summary of
the FCC's regulation in this context, see Petition of US West Communications,
Inc. for Forbearance from Regulation as a Dominant Carrier in the Phoenix, Ari-
zona MSA, CC Docket No. 98-157, Rel. No. FCC 99-365, 1999 FCC LEXIS 6018,
paras. 3-4 (Nov. 22, 1999).
111. See Donald V. Harper, Regulation of Aircraft Noise at Major Airports:
Past, Present, and Future, 17 TRANSP. L.J. 117, 140 (1988).
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munications industry-where customers have the ability to use
service at any time, as opposed to being dependent upon carri-
ers' schedules-meant that the regulatory agency did not have
control comparable to the ICC's or CAB's over service decisions.
This is not to suggest that the agency has played no role in
controlling the amount of telephone service available to con-
sumers. From its creation in 1934, the FCC has been charged
with promoting the goal of universal service. 112 In the original
paradigm of regulated industries law, the FCC sought to
achieve this goal by permitting widespread cross-subsidies,
"meaning that some customers paid rates in excess of the fully
allocated costs of service in order to allow other customers to be
charged rates less than the fully allocated costs of service."1 3
This cross-subsidization was easily accomplished so long as one
corporate entity (i.e., the Bell System) provided all types of
service (e.g., both local and long-distance service) to all types of
customers (e.g., business and residential, urban and rural), and
reasonably easily accomplished even after divestiture through
above-cost access charges. The company could match shortfalls
in revenues in one service or geographic area with revenues
that exceeded costs in other areas.
The new paradigm of regulated industries law, as particu-
larly manifested in telecommunications, has yielded important
changes in who gets subsidies for universal service and in the
mechanism for funding those subsidies. As to the former, there
is now a generalized list of entities statutorily entitled to uni-
versal service subsidies. These include not only "rural, insular,
and high cost" customers but also, more specifically, "educa-
tional providers and libraries.11 As to the latter, the cross-
subsidies of the single service provider have been supple-
mented with fees or taxes imposed by the agency in response to
Congress's directive that the agency ensure universal service.
Significantly, the agency has not been required to yield its tra-
ditional role of ensuring universal service. If anything, the
112. Section 1 of the Communications Act creates the FCC, among other
reasons, "[flor the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce ... by
wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio com-
munication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." 47 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1994).
113. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1346.
114. Id. (quoting and discussing 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. III 1997)).
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agency must be more involved than in the past, for the new
system requires collecting funds from multiple corporate enti-
ties and distributing them to others, whereas in the past only
intracorporate accounting transfers were required.
Notwithstanding this increased involvement in universal
service matters, the FCC cannot engage in some of the same
regulation of service as it did, or could have done, in the past.
That is because of the decreased emphasis on-indeed, de-
creased incidence of--carriers' tariffs. Although the FCC ulti-
mately was unsuccessful in persuading the courts that it pos-
sessed authority under the original Communications Act to
remove or substantially alter the tariff-filing requirement for
large numbers of carriers, '15 the agency has claimed much the
same authority under the requirement in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 that it "forbear" from enforcing statutory re-
quirements in particular circumstances. 116 Substantial service
and rate regulation is not possible in the absence of tariffs-a
point that the Supreme Court made forcefully before Con-
gress's award of "forbearance" authority to the FCC expanded
the agency's powers. 7 Finally, the telecommunications indus-
try, at the high end of the market, witnessed much of the same
kind of migration to contract arrangements as marked the
transportation industries.11 In these circumstances, the FCC's
present-day control over service offerings by telecommunica-
tions carriers does not approach its previous levels.
4. Other Regulatory Authority
Because the FCC uses its section 214 authority as the ve-
hicle for reviewing proposed mergers of telecommunications
companies, this article has already discussed the agency's
merger review.119 While that discussion does not require re-
115. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
116. See supra note 86 (describing "forbearance" authority); Policy and Rules
Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 14 F.C.C.R. 6004 (1999).
117. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 229-31 (explaining at length
that "[t]he tariff-filing requirement is ... the heart of the common-carrier section
of the Communications Act" and that much of the rest of Title II is "premised
upon the tariff-filing requirement" and "would not be susceptible of effective en-
forcement if rates were not publicly filed").
118. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1339 n.65.
119. See supra Part II.A.1; cf. supra Part I.D (discussing agency review of
railroad mergers under rubric of "other regulatory authority"). It has been pro-
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peating here, one other aspect of the FCC's authority over
mergers bears mention. From its original enactment until the
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, section 221 of
the Communications Act of 1934 had given the FCC the
authority to immunize mergers of telephone companies from
antitrust challenges. The FCC was authorized to act upon ap-
plication of "one or more telephone companies" and determine
whether a "proposed consolidation, acquisition, or control will
be of advantage to the persons to whom service is to be ren-
dered and [will be] in the public interest."12° This provision,
which derived from the Willis-Graham Act of 1921,121 was
adopted essentially to permit mergers whose effect was to
eliminate overlapping local telephone systems. 22
While the FCC did not use its authority under section
221(a) to immunize mergers of long-distance carriers from anti-
trust challenges, Congress concluded in the 1996 Act that the
provision's elimination was necessary for several reasons. One
concern was that "the critical term 'telephone company' is not
defined" and that, absent the statute's repeal, the FCC might
use the provision to immunize mergers of companies other than
regulated local carriers. 23 Another was Congress's conclusion
that the Department of Justice should have authority over an-
titrust issues in telecommunications mergers.
124
Thus, the FCC has been required to share control over
mergers with the Department of Justice. As a technical mat-
ter, other than the repeal of the little-used section 221, this has
not been a change in the law. 25 As a practical matter, how-
ever, the changing nature of the telecommunications industry
posed that Congress eliminate the FCC's authority over mergers where the De-
partment of Justice or Federal Trade Commission has reviewed them. See Jeri
Clausing, Compressed Data; 2 Senators Seek Limits on F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 1999, at C3 (reporting criticism of FCC's process).
120. 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1994) (repealed).
121. 42 Stat. 27 (1921).
122. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir.
1983) (providing a succinct explication of this provision).
123. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 200, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124, 214.
124. See id. at 200-01, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 214-15.
125. For a general overview of the FCC's and Department of Justice's re-
spective authority over telecommunications mergers, see James R. Weiss & Mar-
tin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the FCC and the Jus-
tice Department over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 195 (1998).
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makes the Department of Justice's merger authority increas-
ingly important. Mergers were simply not a matter of large
concern so long as a single behemoth (the Bell System) domi-
nated the telecommunications industry. This was, of course,
true not only of the local exchange portions of the industry,
where the BOCs provided service under state-franchised mo-
nopolies to more than eighty percent of the country's telephone
customers, but also of the long-distance industry, where the
combination of these monopolies, the Bell System's own ac-
tions, and the FCC's long-time failure to require equal access
ensured AT&T's dominance.126 There being no significant en-
tity other than the Bell System, there were no significant
mergers.
The breakup of the Bell System did not substantially alter
this situation. On the one hand, the 1982 AT&T consent de-
cree prohibited AT&T from reacquiring any of the divested
BOCs.' 2' On the other hand, the decree restricted the BOCs,
which were owned by seven Regional Holding Companies or
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"), from all busi-
nesses other than the provision of local telephone service. 121
Even when the courts loosened these restrictions somewhat,
the BOCs and their RBOC parent companies continued largely
to be restricted from the long-distance and manufacturing
businesses until the decree was terminated by the 1996 Act. 29
Under the consent decree, in short, the BOCs were kept out of
precisely those businesses where mergers would have been
most attractive.
The 1996 Act promises to change all this. It is true that
the Act initially retains the restriction on an RBOC's providing
long-distance service for calls originating from regions where
that RBOC has historically possessed the local exchange fran-
chise. But the FCC has been given authority to remove this
long-distance restriction when certain conditions are met. 30
126. See generally United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
affd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
127. See id. at 142 n.44, 170 n.166, 227.
128. See id. at 186-95, 227-28.
129. See Kearney, supra note 2, at 1420-59 (describing relevant judicial and
legislative proceedings from AT&T's divestiture of the BOCs in 1984 through the
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
130. Specifically, in order to enter into the long-distance business, an RBOC
must (a) demonstrate that it has complied with a 14-point competitive checklist,
which essentially requires the RBOCs to open up their local exchanges to competi-
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The prospect of this vertical integration has driven several
horizontal mergers among local exchange companies. The
number of very large local exchange carriers has thus gone
from eight in 1996-the seven RBOCs and GTE-to four in the
year 2000.131 These companies are readying themselves for the
removal of the long-distance restriction in toto, whereupon it is
conceivable that the number of giant telecommunications com-
panies will decrease further upon a merger of some long-
distance and local telephone companies. Similar concentration
has marked the long-distance industry.13 2
The Department of Justice recently has demonstrated at
least some interest in superintending mergers in the telecom-
munications industry. For example, it reviewed the Bell Atlan-
tic-NYNEX, Bell Atlantic-GTE, and SBC-Ameritech mergers,
although it found little to object to in any of these instances. 33
Such review is part of the increased importance of anti-
trust law in public utility and common carrier industries, as
the traditional model of an agency's regulating entry, rates,
tion and to unbundle enough network elements that competitors can develop al-
ternatives to the RBOCs' local exchanges; (b) comply with a separate-subsidiary
requirement; and (c) persuade the FCC that the RBOC's entry into long distance
is "consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C.
§ 271(b)(1), (d)(3) (Supp. III 1997). The FCC recently approved for the first time
an application by an RBOC for authority to offer basic long-distance service in one
of the states in its region-over the differing recommendation of the Department
of Justice, it might be noted. See Application by Bell Atlantic New York for
Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-
Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, CC Docket No. 99-295, FCC
99-404, 1999 FCC LEXIS 6522 (Dec. 22, 1999); Seth Schiesel, First Baby Bell to
Gain Approval for Long Distance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, at Al.
131. For an account of the merger trend in telecommunications in the late
1990s, see Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony's Deregulatory
Shootout, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503 (1999). For a critical popular take, see William
Satire, Clinton's Consumer Ripoff, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, at A19.
132. See Chen, supra note 131.
133. See Bell Atlantic-GTE; Merger Plan Approved, with a Condition, CHI.
TRIB., May 8, 1999, Bus. Section, at 2 (reporting Department of Justice's approval
of merger contingent upon the combined company's eliminating through divesti-
ture overlapping wireless systems in 65 markets in nine states); SBC Clears Hur-
dle over Telecoms Acquisitions, FIN. TIMES (USA edition 2), Mar. 24, 1999, at 1
(reporting Department of Justice approval of SBC-Ameritech merger contingent
upon the combined company's divesting itself of one of two overlapping cellular
systems in 17 markets); Mark Landler, Merger of NYNEX and Bell Atlantic
Clears U.S. Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1997, at Al (reporting Department of
Justice's announcement that it would not oppose merger).
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and service has given way.1 4 Given the level of concentration
that has been achieved in the short time since the passage of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, there can be lit-
tle doubt that neither the Department of Justice's antitrust
authority nor any general regulatory authority of the FCC has
stood in the way of recent telecommunications mergers.
B. "A New FCC for the 21st Century"
If the FCC does not actively regulate entry (at least in a
categorical sense), or seek to dictate a carrier's service offer-
ings, or monitor rates as it did in the past, what does the
agency do in its regulation of common carriers? The FCC re-
cently has undertaken to answer questions such as this. In
August 1999, the FCC delivered to Congress a document enti-
tled "A New FCC for the 21st Century: Draft Strategic Plan.""1 5
This strategic plan outlines how the FCC envisions itself ful-
filling its statutory mandates in the future. The FCC's strate-
gic plan contains a number of elements meriting description
and comment.'36
The premise of the plan is the FCC's expectation that, in
five years from the plan's issuance, "U.S. communications mar-
kets [will] be characterized predominately [sic] by vigorous
competition that will greatly reduce the need for direct regula-
tion." '137 The agency has indicated that this competition will
not simply exist within traditional communications market
classifications, such as local telephony, long-distance teleph-
ony, and cable television, but will arise from what is frequently
termed "convergence."138 Along these lines, the FCC has spe-
cifically pointed to "[tihe advent of Internet-based and other
134. For an elaboration on this point concerning the increased importance of
antitrust, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1361, 1364, 1407 n.382, 1409.
135. This document is available at <http://www.fcc.gov/21st century/
draft_strategic._plan.txt> (visited Feb. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Strategic Plan]. The
FCC also welcomes comments on the plan by e-mail directed to <newfcc@fcc.gov>.
136. Although editorializing can largely be deferred to Part III of this arti-
cle, the following account should not be regarded as merely accepting at face value
the FCC's stated goals or motivations in this proceeding.
137. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 1.
138. Convergence occurs when content becomes independent of the means of
transmission-so that on the one hand, any carrier may be used, and on the other
hand, any carrier may transmit any kind of content.
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new technology-driven communications services,"' 39 which it
has concluded "will continue to erode the traditional regulatory
distinctions between different sectors of the communications
industry."4 '
In broad terms, the conclusion that follows from this
premise of vigorous competition is clear to the agency: "[Olver
the next five years, the FCC must wisely manage the transition
from an industry regulator to a market facilitator." '141 The stra-
tegic plan attempts to set forth, in varying amounts of detail,
how the agency intends to make this transition. The FCC or-
ganized the bulk of its plan into four constituent goals and ob-
jectives: it will seek to "create a model agency for the digital
age," "promote competition in all communications markets,"
"promote opportunities for all Americans to benefit from the
communications revolution," and "manage the electromagnetic
spectrum (the nation's airwaves) in the public interest."'
The essence of the FCC's attempt to "create a model
agency for the digital age" is its desire to be "a faster, flatter,
more functional agency. "13 As part of this effort, the FCC pro-
poses to alter its current structure, which proceeds "along the
traditional technology lines of wire, wireless, satellite, broad-
cast, and cable communications."'4 If Congress permits, the
FCC will first consolidate dispersed functions into a new En-
forcement Bureau and a new Consumer Information Bureau.
It will then take other steps toward the goal of "a new agency
structure comprised of enforcement, consumer information, li-
censing, competition/policy, and international areas [in place
of] the current traditional, industry-specific bureaus."' Other
elements of this goal will include efforts to "[clreat[e] a paper-
less FCC" through automation and electronic filing systems,
"[develop] the FCC's web site into a model for accessibility and
availability of information," reduce backlogs of licensing appli-
cations, reconsiderations, and other proceedings, increase reli-
ance on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and negoti-
139. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 1.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (capitalization removed); see also id. at 8-22.
143. Id. at 11.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Id.
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ated rulemakings, and make greater use of the agency's for-
bearance authority.
46
These goals do not conflict with traditional regulation of
the telecommunications industry. Although the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 presupposes a sort of basic division between
common carrier services and broadcast services,147 the FCC
could take each of the foregoing steps consistent with the origi-
nal paradigm of regulated industries law. For example, noth-
ing logically turns on whether the FCC receives or disperses in-
formation through paper filings and printings or through the
internet or other forms of electronic media,148 or whether it is
the familiar Common Carrier Bureau or a new Enforcement
Bureau that polices telephone company compliance with the
FCC's regulations and the governing laws.
It is in the FCC's second objective-promoting competition
in all communications markets-that the agency demonstrates
the extent of its commitment to the new paradigm of regulated
industries law. One way in which the FCC intends to accom-
plish this goal is by eliminating barriers to entry in domestic
markets. This includes all "legal, economic, or operational"
barriers, whether they are the traditional ones described above
(such as section 214 of the Communications Act) or newer legal
ones (such as the restriction in section 271 of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 on RBOC entry into long distance).149
Another way is to "deregulate as competition develops."'' ° This
146. Id. at 9-12. For a description of the FCC's authority (nay, duty) to "for-
bear" from regulation in certain circumstances, see supra note 86.
147. Compare Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, tit. II, 48
Stat. 1064, 1070-81 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997) (governing "common carrier[s] engaged in interstate or foreign commu-
nication service by wire or radio") (quoted material at § 201(a)) with Communica-
tions Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, tit. III, 48 Stat. at 1081-92 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399b (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (setting forth provi-
sions designed to maintain government control but also to provide for private use
of "all the channels ... of radio transmission") (quoted material at § 301)).
148. The FCC proposes to go away from the Federal Register in favor of elec-
tronic publication of its proposed rules. See Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 36.
This is among many proposed changes that would require authorization from
Congress, which mandated the creation of the Federal Register and requires pub-
lication in it of various government matters. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511 (1994).
On the origins of the Federal Register, see Charles Alan Wright, "A Man May Live
Greatly in the Law," 70 TEX. L. REV. 505, 516 n.71 (1991) (and sources cited
therein).
149. See Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 13.
150. See id. at 14 (capitalization removed).
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includes an initiative to "[e]nd rate regulation where competi-
tion has matured." '151 This, too, has already proved to be part of
the great transformation of regulated industries law and, as
described above and elsewhere,152 has already marked much of
telecommunications law specifically. Another subsidiary goal,
though general in nature, also reflects the transformation: the
FCC will seek to "enforce the rules so that businesses compete
fairly."'53 This reflects the transformation of the role of the
agency "from one of protecting end-users to one of arbitrating
disputes among rival providers and, in particular, overseeing
access to and pricing of 'bottleneck' facilities that could be ex-
ploited by incumbent firms to stifle competition."'54  Finally,
the FCC implicitly acknowledges that the transformation is
less complete in international communications markets, for the
agency pledges to aggressively increase competition in this in-
dustry component. Such an increase in competition would not
only benefit American consumers directly, through lower rates
for international telecommunications services, but also would
open new market opportunities for American companies.
This second objective, therefore, simply continues the
transformation of telecommunications law that has occurred
over the last quarter-century. Much of the FCC's strategic plan
uses language to which it would be difficult to object. The FCC
speaks of seeking to "eliminat[e] unnecessary rules,"
"[rieduce... burden[s]," "resist regulatory intervention," "show
zero tolerance for perpetrators of consumer fraud such as
slamming and cramming," "expeditiously resolve complaints,"
and so on.'55 Nonetheless, under the long view, the extent of
the apparent consensus on the part of the FCC and other poli-
cymakers is remarkable. Competition is the mantra, and that
is different from the long-ago view that some competition is
wasteful.'56 It is also different from the more recent view that
151. Id.
152. See supra Part II.A.2; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1337-40,
1362.
153. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 15 (capitalization removed).
154. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1326.
155. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 14-15.
156. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES
38-40 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing this view); 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 5-6 (1970) (same).
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competition, while generally desirable, must be balanced
against other concerns such as universal service.
This introduces the third of the FCC's objectives: "to pro-
mote opportunities for all Americans to benefit from the com-
munications revolution."157 To an extent, this objective is in
tension with the objective of promoting competition. For ex-
ample, the traditional telecommunications goal of universal
service effectively was pursued under the original paradigm
where a monopoly service provider could cross-subsidize its
various services and its various customers. 5 ' Universal service
is more difficult to achieve in the new paradigm, for the very
promise of a model based on competition is that it will drive
prices toward costs. 59 If this occurs, then there is less money
from one service or class of customers with which to subsidize
another service or class of customers.
None of this suggests that universal service is impossible
to promote in the new paradigm of regulated industries law,
only that the traditional means towards this end must be re-
placed. But this shift has practical consequences, because the
new subsidies, which in the telecommunications context are
likely to consist of new taxes or fees imposed on some users for
the benefit of others, will be more transparent and thus more
controversial:
Under the original paradigm, the process of subsidizing
some end-users at the expense of others remained largely
hidden from view. The cross-subsidies that made this pos-
sible were buried in a maze of regulatory complexity, and
very few people were aware that a portion of their transpor-
tation or utility bill either was paying for someone else's
service or was being paid for by someone else. Under the
new paradigm, the issue of subsidies must be brought into
the open, and hence becomes politicized. 160
The FCC nonetheless appears committed to promoting the
availability of services even where cost-based pricing would not
suffice. For example, the agency pledges in its strategic plan
157. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 17 (capitalization removed).
158. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1346-47; supra text following
note 113.
159. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1347-49.
160. Id. at 1348.
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to "[w]ork to ensure that universal service funding... includes
funding for wireless carriers."161
The agency has taken its lead from Congress. The original
Communications Act merely stated that its purposes included
"mak[ing] available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities
at reasonable charges."16 2 The Telecommunications Act of
1996, by contrast, specifies that the FCC (and each state public
utility commission) "shall encourage the deployment on a rea-
sonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications ca-
pability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary
and secondary schools and classrooms)."'63 The universal
service goals of the FCC now encompass "high-speed, switched,
broadband telecommunications [providing] high-quality voice,
data, graphics and video telecommunications." '64
Under the rubric of its third goal of "promot[ing] opportu-
nities for all Americans to benefit from the communications
revolution," the FCC includes more than universal service; it
also wants to "foster a more consumer friendly marketplace." 165
This includes such varied goals as seeking to "[e]nsure that
consumer bills are truthful, clear and easy to understand," "[to]
remain vigilant in protecting consumer privacy," to provide
parents with information on V-chips and other restrictive tech-
nology, and to avoid unnecessary area code changes and the
premature exhaustion of the current North American Num-
bering Plan.166 As a means of ensuring continued political sup-
port, the FCC is well advised to pay attention to matters such
as these. Virtually everyone receives a phone bill, is at least
somewhat interested in protecting his privacy, and has an area
code that he would prefer not to see changed, let alone regu-
larly. Controversies involving these matters are therefore the
types of issues that can prompt a groundswell of interest and
161. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 17.
162. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat.
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
163. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. VII, § 706(a),
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 153 (set forth as note following 47 U.S.C. § 157
(Supp. III 1997)).
164. Id. § 706(c)(1) (set forth as note following 47 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. III
1997)).
165. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 19.
166. Id.
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can even result in congressional attempts to legislate if the
FCC is perceived as falling short.16
The FCC's final stated goal is to "manage the electromag-
netic spectrum (the nation's airwaves) in the public interest."168
While much of this goal relates to the FCC's Title III broad-
casting regulation, as opposed to its common carrier regulation
under Title II, the use of the airwaves for wireless telephony
over the last twenty years and the phenomenon of convergence
make any regulation of the spectrum relevant to traditional
regulated industries law as well. According to its strategic
plan, the most important things that the FCC intends to do in
this context are to continue to increase its reliance on the mar-
ket for allocation of spectrum resources, though not to rely on
the market altogether, and to increase the amount of the spec-
trum that is available, particularly for new services. 169 The
FCC has done each of these things in recent years. For exam-
ple, in the 1990s it made room on the spectrum, including
through reallocation, for Personal Communications Services
("PCS"). It then auctioned off licenses for much of this newly
available spectrum. 7 °
The foregoing strategic plan reflects the fact that the
FCC's traditional approach of regulating entry, rates, and
service has given way in the last quarter-century. That much
is incontestable. The question thus becomes whether the
agency's future lies in the direction proposed by the agency it-
self in the strategic plan, or whether it lies somewhere else in-
stead. The following portion of this article takes up that in-
quiry, which, being predictive, is more open to debate.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE FCC
This Part begins by sketching out three possible futures for
the FCC based on the foregoing account. It then explores the
167. Caller ID services, telemarketing, and slamming are all examples of
issues that prompted some congressional interest (though not necessarily action)
in the 1990s. Part of the motivation for congressional attention undoubtedly was
to ensure agency attention to the issue.
168. Strategic Plan, supra note 135, at 20 (capitalization removed).
169. See id. at 20-22.
170. For a description of these events, see Thomas W. Hazlett & Babette
E.L. Boliek, Use of Designated Entity Preferences in Assigning Wireless Licenses,
51 FED. COMM. L.J. 639 (1999) (and sources cited therein).
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causes of the transformation that has already occurred over the
past quarter-century in transportation and telecommunications
regulation. Finally, this Part makes a tentative prediction as
to which of the three futures is the most likely for the FCC.
A. Some Possible Futures for the FCC
The foregoing account of the developments in transporta-
tion and telecommunications regulation in the past twenty-five
years and of the FCC's strategic plan suggests a variety of pos-
sible futures for the agency. Specifically, each of three possible
results-agency abolition, agency reduction, and agency rein-
vention-finds some support. The following describes each of
these possibilities.
The first possibility is that the agency will be abolished.
This possibility did not always need to be taken seriously. For
example, writing in 1985, Glen Robinson, an academic and
former FCC commissioner, attempted to figure out what the
agency might look like in the year 2000. He quickly noted that
"we need not contemplate for long the possibility that the FCC
will soon follow the Civil Aeronautics Board into the sunset."'7 '
Robinson was correct. But today is not 1985, and the possibil-
ity of the FCC's riding off into the sunset requires more con-
templation than it did even in the recent past.
There are several reasons that the agency termination
scenario cannot be dismissed out of hand. One is that the CAB
no longer provides our only example of agency termination.
The ICC has also joined the CAB in the history books. 17 2
Moreover, we must contemplate the agency's abolition because
our ways of thinking about the telecommunications industry
have changed even in the last fifteen years. As most notably
reflected in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the baseline
expectation or at least desire, in every segment of telecommu-
nications, is competition.'73 This, too, could logically culminate
in the agency's termination. 174 And, finally, there have been a
171. Glen 0. Robinson, The FCC in the Year 2000, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 155,
158 (1985).
172. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
173. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1361-63.
174. See id.
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number of high-profile calls for the agency's abolition in recent
years.17
A second possibility is not abolition but reduction. Under
this scenario, the agency's authority would be reduced to situa-
tions in which there is some reason to think that reliance on
the market, though desirable, is not feasible. Here, too, we can
see an analogy in the transportation industry. For it is, of
course, not entirely precise to speak, as the previous paragraph
does, of the ICC's termination. As discussed in Part I of this
article, in the same act in which Congress abolished the ICC,
Congress quietly created a new agency, the STB. 176 The new
STB possesses some of the same powers as the ICC, particu-
larly over the railroad industry.' At bottom, the STB retained
authority in areas in which there are unusually strong interest
group influences or genuine concerns about continued monop-
oly power by the railroads over particular routes (examples of
these areas being railroad mergers and abandonment of local
rail lines). The STB generally does not have authority over the
trucking industry, which has long been thought to be far less
susceptible to market failure than the railroad industry. 171
A third possibility is agency reinvention, along the lines of
the Clinton-Gore efforts of the mid-1990s to "reinvent govern-
175. See, e.g., HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ROLLING BACK GOVERNMENT (Scott
A. Hodge ed., 1995); PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH
THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997); GEORGE A.
KEYWORTH ET AL., THE TELECOM REVOLUTION-AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY
(1995); see also Alan Pearce, Telecom Reform on the Money for GOP Backers,
NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 20, 1995, at 1, 20 (recounting comment by then-Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich that contemplated abolishing the FCC).
176. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The word "quietly" recom-
mends itself because Congress was savvy about the matter: it made sure to call
the act the "ICC Termination Act of 1995," not the "Surface Transportation Board
Creation Act." And someone (I do not know that it was Congress) made sure that
the STB-which Congress deemed an "independen[t]" agency "within the De-
partment of Transportation," see 49 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 703(c) (Supp. III 1997), a
concept beyond this article's contemplation-did not simply operate out of the
same offices as the ICC. Indeed, the bronze or gold letters spelling out "Interstate
Commerce Commission" alongside the door of the agency's grand building on Con-
stitution Avenue in Washington, D.C., were scraped off in short order in early
January 1996. It is also beyond this article's scope to contemplate any signifi-
cance of the fact that another distinctively American institution-the Internal
Revenue Service-soon took up residence in much of the ICC's former quarters.
177. See generally supra Part I.
178. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1334 & n.39, 1391 & n.310 (and
sources cited therein).
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ment."19 The FCC itself is expending substantial resources in
this direction. Agency reinvention is the purpose of the FCC's
docket, described above, aimed at creating "A New FCC for the
21st Century."' The docket may be seen as the agency's at-
tempt to seize control of the debate and stave off the first or
second scenario (i.e., agency abolition or reduction). Under this
third scenario, the FCC would continue to exist and indeed to
possess the same formal authority as previously, but its focus
would not be the traditional regulation of entry, rates, and
service that long characterized this agency and others modelled
on the original ICC.
B. Recalling the Causes of the Great Transformation
Before essaying a prediction, it is useful to recall that the
developments in transportation and telecommunications regu-
lation over the past twenty-five years have been but one part of
the sweeping transformation of regulated industries law. To
the extent that the developments in transportation and tele-
communications regulation had the same (or different) under-
lying causes, this may give us a sense of the FCC's future.
Three features of that transformation seem particularly rele-
vant here.
One is that the role of the courts, though overall that of a
random factor sometimes advancing and other times retarding
the transformation, has been particularly significant in the
telecommunications sphere.18 Simply put, there are numerous
First Amendment arguments available to opponents of tele-
communications. regulation that never provided viable chal-
lenges in the transportation industries. The First Amendment
has become and likely will remain "the preferred constitutional
assault vehicle for telecommunications companies challenging
government regulation."18
2
179. See VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT
THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (1993); Ann Devroy & Stephen Barr,
Clinton Offers Plan to Fix a "Broken" Government, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1993, at
Al (describing unveiling of National Performance Review headed by Vice Presi-
dent Gore and summarizing some of its recommendations).
180. See supra Part II.B.
181. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1370-77.
182. Id. at 1370-72.
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Second, the role of the agencies has not conformed to the
popular theory that many academics and policymakers instinc-
tively credit. Specifically, much of the transformation in the
regulation of the transportation, telecommunications, and en-
ergy industries cannot simply be explained by a model of
agency capture. The transformation rather has been charac-
terized by a variety of administrative agency attitudes. To take
the most pertinent example, that of the FCC, once the agency
had been boxed around by the D.C. Circuit in the 1970s, it be-
came an active proponent of regulatory change, even when that
change did not Seem to benefit current actors in the agency or
its most powerful regulatees. 83
Third, the move away from the original paradigm of regu-
lated industries law to a new paradigm (marked by an empha-
sis on competition) in so many industries is best accounted for
not by technological change or some "chain reaction," but by
two other factors. One is the rise of interest groups acting to
alter the regulatory landscape."' While the earlier manifesta-
tions of the great transformation did not conform to the inter-
est group theory of politics (including its manifestations in the
motor carrier industry and subsequent early developments in
telecommunications), many other changes have conformed to
that theory. The other substantial force in the transformation
has been the perceptions of regulatory failure built up over
time.l8 5 Simply put, given the assault of those such as econo-
mists in the Chicago School, numerous elites lost faith in the
183. See id. at 1367; see also HUBER ET AL., supra note 83, § 9.4.1, at 756.
For another suggestion that capture theory cannot explain many agency actions of
the past several decades, see Paul Stephen Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in
Transportation: Monopoly Is the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505, 578-80
(1987) (arguing that "[wihatever validity the theory may have once held for the
ICC, it seems to have lost much of its credence during the last decade"). For an
argument that capture theory "is a much more promising candidate for predicting
regulatory behavior where the regulatory agency in question regulates a single
industry whose membership has more or less unified interests and goals," see
Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1277, 1284-85 (1989) (setting this forth as the reason capture theory does not
explain actions of ICC). Earlier assessments of the ICC strongly supported the
argument of capture. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. FELLMETH ET AL., THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970); Huntington,
supra note 7.
184. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1393-97.
185. See id. at 1397-1403.
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idea that regulatory forces were any more likely than market
forces to protect the public interest (whatever that might be).
C. A Prediction
So which will it be-agency abolition, along the lines of the
ICC trucking model; formal agency reduction, wherein the
agency continues to exist in some form but with a reduced
sphere of authority essentially limited to situations where
there is some irreducible monopoly power, along the lines of the
ICC railroad model; or government reinvention, along the lines
of the FCC's strategic plan? It would be imprudent to specu-
late-virtually no one correctly predicted back in 1975 what
would become of the CAB and ICC.8 6 But it would be discour-
teous, having accepted the invitation to participate in this
symposium, for me not to speculate. And so, caught between
two values, I shall cast aside prudence and err on the side of
courtesy.
There is much to be said for the prediction that the course
of telecommunications regulation will follow the ICC trucking
model and that the agency will be abolished. If the 1996 Act
works as advertised, the FCC should be history. If there are
competitive options along all segments of the communications
grid, then there is no need for regulation to forestall leveraging
of bottlenecks. Traditional regulation, we now recognize, rises
and falls with monopoly."8 7 If localized monopolies give way to
universal competition, then traditional regulation has no en-
during rationale.
So far, the 1996 Act has not produced a revolution. But it
may yet. All the merger activity along the lines of conver-
gence-in other words, not only the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX and
SBC-Ameritech-type mergers, but also the AOL-Time Warner
merger and the AT&T-TCI and AT&T-MediaOne mergers-
suggests that the telecommunications world is rapidly
repositioning itself for the day when two or three mega-
companies offer "one-stop shopping" in the form of traditional
telecommunications service, wireless service, internet access,
186. See id. at 1407 & n.383.
187. See generally id. at 1359-65.
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remote video, and all the rest."'8 If that day comes, what con-
ceivable function does the FCC serve in terms of policing mo-
nopoly power? We do not even have anything analogous to
abandonment of local railroad lines that would draw support
for the agency's continued existence.
Continuing on with the argument for predicting abolition,
what about reinvention? One possibility is that the FCC can
become a kind of consumer protection agency-a Federal Avia-
tion Authority ("FAA") for the communications world.8 9 Under
this reinvention scenario, the agency would monitor slamming
complaints, provide information about V-chips, and occasion-
ally (to the extent the First Amendment permits) sanction In-
finity Broadcasting for the Howard Stern show.19° But relative
to regulating the Bell System's rates, this is penny-ante stuff.
And the forces of competition among the behemoths should
provide a much more effective constraint against consumer
abuses than regulation could. There are also some reasons in
the trends in First Amendment law to think that some of these
agency efforts would be struck down in the courts (and I am not
just referring to broadcast regulation)."'
The prediction of abolition and against government rein-
vention would also have to dispose of the possibility that the
need to superintend universal service will support the agency's
188. On these mergers, see generally Kearney, supra note 2, at 1399-1400 &
nn.14-15; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1373 n.238; Chen, supra note 131;
Saul Hansell, America Online Agrees to Buy Time Warner for $165 Billion; Media
Deal Is Richest Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at Al; Seth Schiesel, For
AT&T's Chief, A Redefined Cable Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, § 3, at 1.
189. It is helpful to recall that, although the CAB was abolished, and with it
almost all direct government control over entry, rates, and service in the airline
industry, there already was another agency, the FAA, that acted as a consumer-
protection agency in the airline context by, for example, regulating airline safety.
See generally Stephen E. Creager, Note, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regula-
tion, 93 YALE L.J. 319, 319-21 (1983) (and sources cited therein) (summarizing
CAB's and FAA's historical powers). That separate agency was not eliminated.
The FCC, by contrast, has played both the role of imposing classic economic
regulation, like the CAB, and the role of otherwise seeking to protect consumers,
like the FAA.
190. For some sense of the FCC's actions to date in the particular areas
noted, see Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 49 (1992/1993) ; Charles W. Logan, Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New
Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1687, 1695 (1997); Christopher R. Day, Comment, Hanging Up on Consum-
ers: Why the FCC Cannot Stop Slamming in the New Telecommunications Market,
47 AM. U. L. REV. 421 (1997).
191. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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continued existence. The future mandate of the FCC may be to
tax ordinary telecommunications users in order to provide sub-
sidies to politically favored classes of users, such as schools, li-
braries, and the rural poor. There are indications of this future
in the 1996 Act. But this may be a pipe dream. Once the tax-
ing and subsidizing become highly visible-and they must be,
for we are no longer talking about intracorporate transfers here
as was the case in the days of old under the Bell System-the
behemoths will have an incentive to mobilize customers in op-
position to purely redistributive taxes. This already has hap-
pened in response to the FCC's initial efforts to implement the
universal service provisions.1 92
A final possibility is that we need the FCC to allocate and
police uses of the broadcast spectrum. There is merit to this
point. On the other hand, once allocated, the spectrum could
be bought and sold without regard to "public interest" inquir-
ies.193 The recent decisions to allocate PCS licenses through an
auction suggest that we may be headed in this direction.'94
In short, there is much basis for thinking that the ICC
trucking model will win out and the FCC will be abolished.
But I expect that it will not, for a number of reasons. The fu-
ture is more likely to be some combination of the agency-
reductionlagency-reinvention scenarios described above.19 In
other words, the agency will continue to exist in some form
(though perhaps as an executive branch agency), but with the
more intrusive forms of regulation that characterized FCC and
ICC regulation in the past-that is, regulation of entry, rates,
and service-radically diminished and only in force where
there is some reason to expect market failure.196
This is my prediction for several reasons. One reason is
that developments in telecommunications law have not traced
precisely the same arc over the last twenty-five years as those
in transportation law. Both share the same historical origins-
192. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1348-49 n.115.
193. See HUBER, supra note 175, at 63-76 (arguing for such an approach);
R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959)
(landmark article proposing such a system).
194. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part III.A.
196. For some suggestions of specific changes in the Communications Act
that Congress might make short of abolishing the FCC, see William H. Read &
Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform: Governing Requires a New Standard, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 289 (1997).
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the rate-regulated, entry-restricted model derived from the In-
terstate Commerce Act and its amendments-and both have
undergone, along with other regulated industries, a thorough-
going transformation in the last twenty-five years. While there
are many common aspects of this transformation-elimination
of entry controls, severely curtailed tariff filing, and less gov-
ernment regulation of service decisions-there are some impor-
tant differences. One need only look at the checklist of section
271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to realize that the
trend in telecommunications law is not necessarily the same
trend toward deregulation and common law as has marked the
trucking industry.197
Section 271 brings me to a second reason that I expect that
the agency will continue to exist. The day will come when all
the RBOCs will have received long-distance authority in all ar-
eas where they are landline local service providers (although it
is not likely that this day will be in the next couple of years).
Even then, however, there will be a reason-albeit not a need,
it may be conceded, as is currently the case-to continue to
have an agency that handles interconnection disputes. In other
words, trucking is not a network industry in anything like the
sense that telecommunications is. There is reason to think
that, even if the local exchange companies' bottleneck monopo-
lies disappear, telecommunications will, in the eyes of many,
benefit from having a regulator that can adjudicate intercon-
nection disputes.
A third reason weighing against the FCC's elimination is
the aforementioned need for some federal entity to superintend
at least some spectrum-related matters. There are multiple
aspects of current spectrum management, including allocating
the resource among different uses, developing the service rules
governing the usage of spectrum within the allocations, as-
signing licenses to particular users within the allocations, en-
forcing the resulting rights conveyed by the license, and pro-
tecting the resource against "pollution." It is worth noting that
not all of these functions are carried out exclusively by the
FCC, as is often instinctively assumed.1 9 It is also true that
197. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1997) (setting forth fourteen-
point checklist that each RBOC's access or interconnection arrangements must
meet before the RBOC will be allowed to provide in-region long-distance service).
198. For example, the use of the spectrum by the federal government is re-
served to the President, who has delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of
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the extent of reliance on markets for spectrum matters-as op-
posed to the traditional command-and-control agency model-
likely will increase in the coming times.' 99 But it is also
probable that some of these functions will not be easily
privatized or outsourced. In these circumstances, the
advantages of removing independent-agency superintendence
of all the foregoing spectrum functions are not likely to be so
overwhelmingly clear as to generate mass support for such a
wholesale change of a more than seventy-year tradition of
government regulation. °°
A final reason that I do not foresee the ICC trucking sce-
nario (or CAB scenario) playing out in the context of the FCC is
the amount of political will that would be required to abolish
the FCC. The current political climate does not favor outright
abolition of agencies. Indeed, both the CAB's termination and
the ICC's quasi-termination were products of particular politi-
cal times. In the instance of the CAB in the late 1970s, there
was particular reason to seek a structural "fix" for inflation and
other economic maladies of the time. In the instance of the ICC
in 1995, both the Republicans who had swept into control of
Congress in 1994 (but who had largely failed to dramatically
reduce the size of government as they had promised) and
President Clinton (who had an interest in showing himself a
Commerce and thence to the National Telecommunications and Information Asso-
ciation ("NTIA"). See Dale N. Hatfield, Spectrum Issues for the 1990s: New Chal-
lenges for Spectrum Management, Paper Delivered at Centre for International Re-
search on Communication and Information Technologies (Nov. 23, 1993),
available at Spectrum Issues for the 1990s (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.
annenberg.nwu.edu/pubs/spectrum>. The NTIA coordinates with the Interde-
partmental Radio Advisory Committee concerning the federal government's use of
its portion of the spectrum. See id.
199. For some suggestions as to how this may (and in the authors' view
should) occur, see Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based
Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest (last modified Jan. 1997)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering-Technology/Informal/spectrum.txt>.
200. I do not wish to overstate the importance of mass support if deregula-
tion is to occur. As suggested elsewhere and as recalled above, it is in many
senses more important whether or not elite opinion has moved toward a consen-
sus on the matter. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1399-1403 (describing
importance of "elite opinion about economic regulation of public utilities and
common carriers" in the transformation of regulated industries law) (quoted ma-
terial at 1399); supra text accompanying note 185. In this regard, perhaps one
should say that the views of Coase, see supra note 193, have not been so univer-
sally accepted in the ensuing 41 years among elites as to suggest that there will
soon be a consensus in that quarter supporting complete elimination of govern-
ment regulation of commercial use of the spectrum (else the consensus already
would have emerged and had more substantial effects).
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"new Democrat") had reason to seek out the political trophy of
the ICC. I do not wish naively to suggest that economic times
will always remain good, as they currently are, or that political
contexts will not change. Indeed, once the FCC is reduced to a
mere shell of its former self-as to some extent has already
happened and as will continue to happen-somebody will be
able to make some political hay by seeking to terminate the
agency. I expect these efforts not to succeed, but mainly be-
cause the agency's own actions will have reduced its sphere of
authority to politically acceptable levels.
CONCLUSION
The FCC is likely to remain with us for some time. I am
not the first to make that observation, 0 1 nor is this the first
time that I have made it.2" 2 The observation is nonetheless a
prediction at best and, moreover, focuses on a formality. As for
the predictive aspect, the changes in transportation regulation
over the last quarter-century demonstrate that continued exis-
tence of even the most longstanding of agencies-the ICC-
cannot be regarded as an inevitability. That brings us to the
formality: to say merely that the FCC will continue to exist is
to say little about the future course of federal
telecommunications regulation.
It is for these reasons that the foregoing not only recounts
the course of developments in the transportation and telecom-
munications industries but also summarizes the FCC's own
tentative plans for remaking itself. The possibility of success-
ful agency reinvention cannot simply be dismissed, particularly
given the considerable extent to which, since Execunet, the
FCC has shown itself to be generally committed to paring back
traditional regulation in favor of relying on markets and, si-
multaneously, to be able to avoid a major scaling-back by Con-
gress. By this reinvention process, the FCC will likely be able
to stave off more fundamental congressional efforts to elimi-
201. See Robinson, supra note 171, at 158; Harry M. Shooshan III, A Modest
Proposal for Restructuring the Federal Communications Commission, 50 FED.
COMM. L.J. 637, 639-40 (1998) (stating that "[1like it or not.., the FCC is not
going away any time soon," but proposing "a fairly radical reform-replacing the
multimember FCC with a single administrator").
202. See Joseph D. Kearney, Twilight of the FCC?, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 327, 329
(1998).
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nate the agency altogether. And yet, even if this is true, and
even if Congress does not move much further towards formal
reduction of the agency's powers, it appears that the end result
of the reinvention process will be that the agency, though still
in existence, will have gone a long way toward abolishing itself.
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